A SHORT SUMMARY OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

In addition, peace in the Balkans was seen by Ataturk as a defensiye measure against the growing imperialism of Germany. In reviewing Turkish-German relations between the two world wars, a somewhat paradoxical anitude of Turkish statesmen and people towards Germany could be detected. Atatürk himself had bitter memories of German highhandedness during the First World War. it appeared that at any rate white Ataturk was aliye he would never again allow Turkey to be dragged in the polilical wake of Germany.
By 1933, Turkey had started to implement its five-year economic improvement program. Turkey accepted a loan and technical advice from Russia to apply its five-year plan. “There is no doubt that Ataturk’s goal in international economic relations were iversity and balance. Yet, during his era, Turkey became disproportionately entangled
with Nazi Germany. By the mid-1930s, Hitler’s regime had become Turkey’s main trading partner in imports and exports.”33 The sympathy evinced by the Turks for their former German business partners continued because of their popularity. However, Turkey, and Atatürk in particular, did not desire an exelusive German monopoly over the Turkish economy. For example, Turkey contracted for the construction of Karabuk steel and iron mills with a British company. Although Germany wanted to lake Turkey to the ‘revisionists’ camp, it did not join. Germany’s close collaboralion with ıtalyand its negative attitude toward the Montreux Convention created further Turkish suspicions. In 1937, Turkey fell the necessity of countering German-ltaIian pressure.
2) Montreux Convention or 1936 and Turkish.British Relations by the Mediterranean Pa ct
Af ter the resolution of the Mosul dispute, relations between Turkeyand Britain entered a period of stagnation. Although the elimination of the fundamentaI problem formed the foundation for a elose relatianship, it was neither easy nor rapid. The Locamo Agreement, which is called a golden age of inter-war history, created a elimate of relative peace. It was in this period that Turco-Britishrelations became closer.The visit of the British Mediterranean Fleet in 1929 was received positively on both sides. A British- Turkish Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed in 1930. When ltaIy attacked Ethiopia in 1935 Turkey felt the fear of ltaIian imperialism in
the Mediterranean ~egion. Not only Turkey but also Greece felt the necessity of protecting the Eastem Mediıerrancan region against the danger of Italian aggression. Therefore Turkeyand Greece proposed for a Mediterranean Pact was suggested by the French as a means of Franco-1talian detente. The British government never encouraged this proposal before the Abyssinian trouble, because:
(a) Britain did not wish to undertake further commitments beyond the Locarno
.Agreement and the Covenant of the League of Nations,
(b) lt was difficult to see howthe guarantee could be limited to defence against naval
attack in the region. .
33George S. Harris. Turkey:Coplng wlth Crisis. Wesıwiew Press, Colarado.
1985,p.183.
A SHORT SUMMARY OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: 1923-1939 67
(c) lt would be difficult to exclude Egypt, Russia and Romania from partic~ation in the Pact, but their involvement would cause the most difficult problems. 4 In 1936, the situaLİon was completely differenl. Hence Great Britain acceptcd the proposal of Turkey. The Mcditermnean Pact was signcd in July 1936 by Turkey, Greece,
Yugoslavia and Great Britain. The British government declared that ifTurkey, Greece or Yugoslavia should be the victim of an act of unprovoked aggression committed in violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Britain would at once assist these countries.35 In the final analysis, it was elear that it could not be any real Mediterranean
seciırily if France and ltaly did not participate.36 Still, this pact was regarded as evidence of Anglo- Turco-Greek aııiance for peace in Eastem Mediterranean. The Turkish fleet visiled Greece and Malta as a sign of this rapprochement in November 1936.37 if wc look at the international arena in 1936, Gennany began re-armament of the Rhine area; Japan, which was a signatory of the Treaty 0f Lausanne, invaded Manchuria and subsequently withdrew from the League of Nations.Additionally, there was another possibility. Turkey feared that should ltaly succeed in conquering Ethiopia il might tum ils attention to the StraiLS with a view LOensuring oil supplies from the Black Sea. This could been definİlely ensured if ltaly hold the StraiLS.38 Af ter these actions of the
Revisionists states Turkey entcred into diplomatic action for changing the demilitarized status of the Turkish Straits. The Turkish Government presented a fonnal note to the Lausanne signatories.39 Bulgaria, France, Britain, Japan, Romania, Turkeyand the Soviet Union mct at Montreux and signcd a convention on July 20,1936. ltaly refused to sign the convention until 1938. According to the Straits Convention of the Lausanne Treaty, there was to be a demilitarized zone while at’ the same time recognizing Turkish sovereignty. This convention delegated their dcfense to a straiLScommission operating under the auspices of the Assemblyof the Lcague of Nations in conjunction with the great powers. As has been mentioned, the security system of the Lcague was lacking in any real deterrent force against revisionists states.
The British Governmcnt took a sensible attİluçle toward Turkish claims and also the Balkan Entente supp0rlcd Turkey in this maııer. As a result of the conference, Turkish sovereignty and its right LOremilitarize the zane was re-cstablished. From the Turkish point of view, the most important result was that the International Commission ceased functioning af ter October 1,1936. “Like the Lausanne Convention, the Montreux Convention recognized and affirmed ‘the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straİls.’ which was to ‘continue without limit of time’.”40 Briefly, the most important point of the com’cntion \Vas that the passage of warships must be Idt LOthe
34FO:371120382-R 4002/294/67.
35FO:371120382-R 4004/294/67.
36FO:371/20382-R 4005/294/67.
37FO:371( 20382/R7088/294/67.
38FO:371/20073/E2258/26/44.
39FO:371/20073/E 1973/26/44.
40H.N .Howard, Turke)’ the Straits & VS Polic)’, Balıimore, 1974,p.152.

idiscretion and judgment of the Turkish Government if Turkeyı considered itself in danger of imminent war. However, this convention was Turkey’s biggest diplomatic victory between the two World Wars. With respect to the acquisitio~ of rights by legal means, Turkish policy had a unique place in international relations du~ing this period. The sojourn of King Edward VIII in Istanbul in 1936 and Inonu’s visit to London in 1937 symbolized the elimax of the rapprochement between Turkeyand Britain. On May 27, 1938, the Credit Agreement was signed. For a time a silent struggle was waged between Britain, Germanyand Russia to win Turkey’s confidence and friendship.
However, in 1936, Turkey was definitely on England’s side. Furthermore, Turkish- English relatioıis has been facilitated by the Montreux Convention.
3) The Saadabad Pa ct of 1937 with the Eastern Neighbours The other notable achievements in international affairsfollowed. In 1937 Turkey participated to the Saadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. It was Turkey’s attempt to be a bridge between Asia and Europe.41 Establishing an Easlfrn Entente was similar to the Balkan ‘understanding of 1934. Actually, The Middle Eastern States could not accept Turkey as a friend easily because of their history. On one han d they had bitter memories and territorial questions due to Ottoman rule of nearly four centuries, on the other hand the new Turkish Republic attacked on Islam.
The abolishing of the caliphate and the secularisation of the state caused bittemess in Arab countries. Ataturk’s westernization policies separat~d Arabs and Turks. Arab nationalism, anti-westemism and socialism grown up since the First World War, when Turkey felt the Russian pressure. Surprisingly, the fırst sign bf Turkey’s good relations with the Eastem neighbours was initiated by the Soviet UnioıL. The pact of brotherhood between Turkeyand Afghanistan was signed during the War 9f Liberation. Af ter seven
years, Treaty of friendship and economic co-operation was signed at Ankafa on 25th May, 1928 betwee’1 Turkeyand Afghanistan. Object of the treaty was to consolidate further relations established by treaty of i92 i. There was no indication of its being intended to serve as an instrument towards the creation of a ‘Ieague of Eastern Nations,”which Russia has been suspected of desiring to establish. After this agreement Turkey started to lead an Eastem Pacı Turkey signed two agreements with Iran and lraq.42 In addition to the pact of friendship with Iran, the visit of shah Pehlavi served to open a new era in Turca- Iranian relations. Turkeyand Iraq solved the border problem with the Mosul Agreement.
The Saadabad Pact was not a military alliance, but a pact of friendship and solidarity. “The pact called for non-aggression, consultation among the signatory state in case of a threat, and cooperation in stopping subversive activity. Turkey was now the stable link between East and West as the pivotal number of both the Balkan and Eastem agreements.”43 But this Pact never got beyond the i937 stage. Some writers said that Turkey’s adherence to this Pact was a return to Pan-Islamism. These kinds of interpretations wcre wrong. it was elear that Ataturk determined to cut Turkey off from ili oriental and Islamic pası Turkey did .not participate the Islamic
41 FO:371/E5 i66/188/44.
42FO:371/13095/E2802/600/44.
43Yolkan and Itzkowitz, op.clt.,p.325.
A SHORT SUMMARY OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: 1923-1939 69 e
Congresses bctwccn 1926 and 1931. “But this purely defensive Pact, which helped guard her eastern frontiers, did not constitute a threat to the principle of laicism.”44 4) The Question of Hatayand Turkish-Franco Relations
As has been mentioncd, the important problem s between the two countries were the Questjon of Capitulations and the Debts of the Otloman Empire. The world depression made Turkey tighten currency controls. Turkey declared that it could not pay the instalments of Otloman Debts. This declaration caused major problem s bctween Turkey
and France. Af ter several negotiations the Paris Agreement of 1933 was signed.This agreement led to a rapid improvement in the Turkish-Franco relations.
Turkey’s most troublesome frontier was to the south with Syria. The Sanjak of Hatay, were more than 90 000 Turks resided, was within the National Pact frontiers. On the other hand, Turkey accepted the trusteeship of France for the Sanjak with the Ankara Agreement in 1921. According to this agreement, a special administratiye regime was to be established for Hatay.45 It never occurre’d to Turkey that the Sanjak would be considered a part of Syria, because the region was very important to Turkey strategically and for security rea’ions. There was not any problem until 1925. The Turkish-Syrian border became a source of irritation bccause of Syrian agitation. When the Franco-Syria accord, (which was about Syrian interdependence), was signed in 1926 , the Syrians
inı.erpreted its articles as incorporation of the Hatay in Syria. Turkey was concerned about the future of the Sanjak. Turkey objected to the Sanjak’s incorporation in to Syria From the Turkish point of view, the future of the Sanjak should be decided by bilateral treaties between Turkeyand France.
After several deliberalions, the separate polilicalenlity of the Sanjak was accepted in
1937 but there was a dispute over the new elcctoral system. On July 4, 1937, a Turkish-
Franco Treaty of friendship wassigned. The Following year, a Turco-French
eondominium for Hatay was established. “In Septembcr 1938,eleclions were held and the
Turks gained a majority in the assembly which promptly proclaimed autonomy under the
name of Hatay.”46 The new governmcnt was independent for one yeat and then decided
part of Turkey. Franee was forecd to keep silcnt because Gennan and ltalian foreign
policies increased the importance of Turkish-Franco co-opcralion. Hatay was annexed to
Turkey in June 1939. The negolialions over the Hatay was esscntially Ataturk’s last
public ael. He had been ill since Iate in 1937. He did not see the annexation of Hatay to
Turkey bccause he died on Novemocr 10,1938.
This territorial aequisition wasthe only exceplion to a general Turkish policy of
prescrving the statucsque and pcace withits neighbours.
CONCLUSION: ON THE THRESHOLD OF WORLD WAR ii
In 1939, Turkey’s international position was importanl. Hitler sent Franz von
Papen as ambassador to cement Turkish-Gcnnan relations. Britain and Franee, however,
44Lcwis. op.c1t .. p.l 17.
45 Hurcwiız.op.c1t .. p. 98.
46A. Kılıç.Turkey and the World. W.D.C.. 1959.p.65.

secured a military alliance and non-aggression pact. Af ter the Mosul agreement relations ‘ with England improved. Turkey signed a non-aggression pact with France. This pact was about the annexa:tion of Hatay. On October 19, 1939, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed between Britain, France ‘and Turkey.47 Thus, Turkish leaders found themselves in a neuteal position between Germany and the West during the World War II. In the final analysis, Turkey achieved its foreign policy goals during ,this era:
(a) The Republic of Turkey was acceplC<1as a part of the European state system,
(b) Turkey had good relationships with its neighbours and preserved the peace both in
the Balkans and the Middle East ‘. ,
(c) lt was not in th~ revisionist camp; it chose to protect the statues quo between the
two world wars. i
(d) lt was a faithful adherent of internationallaw. J
“By her peaceful methods of negotiations, as compare~ to ltaly’s belligerence,
Turkey gained considerable international stature. Turkey’s good foreign relations were a
consequence of Ataturk’s unyielding resistance to any reviYal of Oltomanist, pan-
Turanian, or pan-Islamic expansionism. The national state in ~ts national frontiers was
not revisionist. ..48 :
. i
As a consequence, i think it is fair to say that all of the international problem s
which remained unsolved at Lausanne, were solved by peacefulımeans during thisperiod
in Turkish foreign policy. , i
47Hurewi tz.,op.clt.,p.226.
48Roderic H. Davison, Turkey: A Short History, 2. Edition, The Eothen Press,
Huntingdon, 1988, p.142.
A SHORT SUMMARY OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: 1923-1939 71
THE BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS AND ARTICLES
ALFORD, J.(Ed.), Greecl! and Turkey:Adversity .in Alliance, Gover Publishing, Guildford, 1984.
ALEXANDRIS, A., The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, Beverley, 1983.
BILGE, S., and et.al., Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1965), Ankara, 1969.
BRUINESSEN, M., Agha. Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structure of Kurdistan, zcd Books, London, 1992.
DA VISON, R.H., Turkey: A Short History, 2. Edition, The Eothen Press, Huntingdon, 1988.
EV ANS, S.F., The Slow Rapprochement:Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal
Ataturk:1919-1939, Beverley, 1982.
FEYZtOOLU, T.(Ed.), Ataturk’s Way, Istanbul, 1982.
HALE, W., and A. BAGIŞ(Eds.), Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations. Beverley,
1984.
HARRIS, G.S., Turkey: Coping with Crisis, Westview Press, Colorado, 1985.
HOW ARD, H., The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, New York, 1966.
——–, Turkey the Straits and US Policy, Baltimore, 1974.
HUREWITZ, J.c., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, VoL.2, London, D. Van
Nostrand Company, 1958. .
KILıÇ, A., Turkeyand the World, Washington, D.C., 1959.
KINROSS, L., Ataturk: Rebirth of aNation. Weidenficld and NicolSün, London, 1964.
LEWIS, G., Nations of the Modern World: Turkey, Third Edition, Emest Benn, London, 1%5
VOLKAN, V.D. and N. ITZKOWITZ, The Immortal Ataturk: A Psycobiography, The University of Chicago, 1984.
THEOTHERS
ı. Foreign Office Files: FO:371, The Public R~ord Officc, London.
2. International Herald Tribune, July 13, 1992.